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Introduction
The idea of a heckler’s veto over disfavored speech has been familiar
for more than half a century.1 Roughly put, the heckler’s veto doctrine
holds that opponents of a speaker should not be permitted to suppress
the speech in question through their own threatened or actual violence.2
As it turns out, though, the meaning, status, and scope of the idea of a
heckler’s veto are today surprisingly far from clear.3 Part II considers
the relevant case law. Part III discusses related events and commentary.
This Article concludes that American legal culture is unlikely to arrive
at any consensual resolution of many of the conflicts and uncertainties
†

Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law.

1.

See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949) (holding that
an ordinance outlawing speech that “stirred people to anger” was
unconstitutional), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308–11 (1940)
(overturning a conviction for speech criticizing religion that offended listeners
as “unduly suppress[ing] free communication of views . . . under the guise of
conserving desirable conditions”).

2.

See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4–5, (holding that that a conviction resting on the
grounds that defendant’s speech “invited public dispute” could not stand). See
infra Sections II–III for numerous concurring authorities. For one recent case
discussion, see Bible Believers v. Wayne County, 805 F.3d 228, 252–55 (6th Cir.
2015) (en banc) (reversing conviction of anti-Islamic proselytizing at an Arab
Festival and holding that the local police effectuated a heckler’s veto by failing
to quall the crowds or protect the speakers).

3.

See infra Parts II–III (describing the state of the heckler’s veto in the law and
in the context of the American education system).
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in question. Understanding why no such consensual resolution of basic
heckler’s veto questions is likely to shed light on the nature of contemporary legal and political controversies more generally. The Conclusion
below focuses in particular on the broad contemporary phenomenon of
what might be called reduced forensic confidence.
If the status, scope, and meaning of the heckler’s veto are indeed
irreconcilably contested, there is probably no entirely neutral grounds
on which to begin any analysis. Merely for the sake of setting this inquiry in motion, however, this Article begins with some provisional
understandings of the basic idea. Typically, the possibility of a heckler’s
veto arises when there is, in one context or another, three elements: 1)
a potential or actual speaker; 2) an audience, at least part of which is
somehow hostile to the speaker or the speech; and 3) some actual or
potential police or other security presence.4 The possible variations on
these three elements, and their interactions, are numerous.
One respected vision of how these elements of speaker, hostile
audience members, and police may generate heckler’s veto scenarios is
that of the distinguished constitutional scholar Harry Kalven, Jr.5
Professor Kalven discusses the idea of a heckler’s veto most extensively
in the context of a particular Supreme Court case that seems to accommodate, rather than disallow, a heckler’s veto.6 On Professor Kalven’s
account, the basic heckler’s veto problem arises when the underlying
speech, to which the presumed heckler objects, does not involve invidious epithets or what the law refers to as “fighting words.”7 The
underlying speech is in itself legally permissible. In a heckler’s veto case,
“[t]he risk of disorder arises because the audience, or some of it, does
not like what the [speaker] is saying and wishes to stop it.”8
4.

For one variety of this general triadic scenario, see Terminiello v. City of
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1949), in which the Court applied the doctrine of the
heckler’s veto to a speaker in an auditorium, protected by police, while a large
protest formed outside.

5.

See Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition 89–105 (1988) (analyzing
the classic heckler’s veto cases and freedom of speech in the context of what he
calls the civil rights cases—Edwards v. South Carolina, Cox v. Louisiana, and
Gregory v. Chicago).

6.

Id. at 89–92. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (upholding a
conviction of a speaker where police believed the speech was stirring the crowd
to violence).

7.

Kalven, supra note 5, at 89. The classic ‘fighting words’ case is Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Chaplinsky allows the prohibition of words
“which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.” Id. at 572. The ideas of injury, and perhaps even of
incitement, are unclear and contestable in the context of fighting words as well
as in heckler’s veto cases.

8.

Kalven, supra note 5, at 89–90.
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Professor Kalven indicates that “[i]n the abstract, if the state did
not like what [the underlying speaker] was saying, it would be powerless
to silence him. In [the heckler’s veto] situation, however, it can claim
neutrality.”9 He then elaborates, pointing to what he takes to be a key
dynamic of the heckler’s veto situation:
[B]y giving the police wide discretion to stop the speaker because
of audience hostility, the state . . . in effect transfers the power of
censorship to the crowd. Moreover, the police are likely to share
the views of the angry audience; hence, their perception of the
unrest may be colored by their assessment of the speaker’s
message.10

Professor Kalven’s account offers a tentative mainstream account of the
most basic nature of a heckler’s veto, and some of its implications.
For the sake of slightly greater convenience, this Article might focus
as well on a simpler formulation of the idea of a heckler’s veto. Thus
very roughly, “[a] heckler’s veto is the suppression of speech by the government . . . because of the possibility of a violent reaction by
hecklers.”11 The analysis below will involve an unpacking and critique
of these basic mainstream formulations of the idea of a heckler’s veto,
as it illustrates the fracturing and fragmentation of the superficially
clear idea of a heckler’s veto.

I. Classic Case Law Understandings of the Heckler’s
Veto
The historic case law of the meaning, scope, and status of the
heckler’s veto has itself displayed a number of important conflicts and
uncertainties. Below, this Part briefly considers some of the more note
worthy judicial markers in the evolution of heckler’s veto doctrine.12
9.

Id. at 90.

10.

Id.

11.

Brett G. Johnson, The Heckler’s Veto: Using First Amendment Theory and
Jurisprudence to Understand Current Audience Reactions Against
Controversial Speech, 21 Comm. L. & Pol’y 175, 180 (2016) (quotations
omitted). But cf. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009)
(raising the possibility of a heckler’s veto over speech uttered by the government
itself). See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Richard Spencer’s Right to Speak at Auburn,
N.Y. Times (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/opinion/
richard-spencers-right-to-speak-at-auburn.html [https://perma.cc/QX3J-UZ49]
(defining the heckler’s veto).

12.

These instances do not exhaust all the significant cases that might be considered
to be heckler’s veto cases and not all of these cases need be universally
recognized as raising genuine heckler’s veto issues.
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For the sake of not pre-judging any important analytical issues—and
for a sense of the doctrinal development over time—these cases are
taken up in chronological order.
This Article could begin the historical exposition at any number of
points, but the 1940 case of Cantwell v. Connecticut13 provides an instance in which speech in what is called a traditional public forum,14 is
constitutionally protected despite the distinctly hostile reaction of the
two relevant listeners to the speech in question.15 Cantwell’s two
initially consensual listeners to his anti-religious and anti-Catholic
speech “were in fact highly offended.”16 In this instance, offense at least
momentarily threatened to transition into physical violence against the
speaker.17 Thus one of the two hearers “said he felt like hitting Cantwell
and the other that he was tempted to throw Cantwell off the street.”18
Cantwell’s speech was in the end constitutionally protected, largely
on the theory that even explicit criticism of a listener’s own religion
should not count as unprotected “abusive remarks directed to the
person of the hearer.”19 The Court in Cantwell found an intent to
persuade, and an absence of any personal epithets20 or intentional discourtesy21 on the speaker’s part. If there is any “abuse” in Cantwell’s
speech, it is thought to operate at the level of abstract, generalized
religious belief, as supposedly distinct from anything that would count
as personal, or identity-threatening, abuse.22

13.

310 U.S. 296 (1940).

14.

Traditional public fora typically include government-owned streets, sidewalks,
and parks open to a remarkably broad range of speakers and subjects. See, e.g.,
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015)
(holding that Texas’s specialty license plates do not fall into the public forum
framework); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,
45–46 (1980) (holding that teacher mailboxes are not public fora like streets
and parks). As will become evident, not all speech subject to a heckler’s veto
need take place in a traditional public forum, or any other form of governmentowned property.

15.

See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308–10 (holding that inflammatory criticism of
organized religion on a public street was protected speech).

16.

Id. at 308–09.

17.

See id. at 309 (noting that the offended listeners wanted to hit the speaker).

18.

Id. No altercation took place, apparently because the speaker agreed to leave
the scene. Id.

19.

Id. See also id. at 310 (finding speaker only made an “effort to persuade”).

20.

Id. at 309–10.

21.

Id. at 310.

22.

See id. (finding that the speaker merely intended to persuade other people of
what he thought was “true religion”). Compare id. with Chaplinsky v. New
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The sense that hostile audience reactions to offensive speech should,
generally, not legitimize the arrest or other forms of censorship of the
speaker was then reinforced in Terminiello v. City of Chicago.23
Terminiello involved indoor speech to a primarily, but not entirely,
supportive audience of about 800,24 with about 1,000 protestors outside
the auditorium.25 The police were not able to prevent several disturbances,26 and the speaker was convicted of a breach of the peace.27
The Court in Terminiello noted that under the breach of the peace
statute, as authoritatively construed, the speaker could have been convicted “if his speech stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or
brought about a condition of unrest.”28 The Court ruled this instruction
constitutionally impermissible.29 In now-classic terms, the Court declared that
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is
often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses
for acceptance of an idea.30

As bracing as this language may be, it is unclear how concretely
descriptive of the circumstances in Terminiello it really is. Generally,
the protesters outside the hall did not hear, and thus could not have

Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (discussing the supposedly more
personally directed insulting epithets and intentional offense).
23.

337 U.S. 1 (1949).

24.

Id. at 2–3.

25.

Id. at 3.

26.

Id. This illustrates the point that a heckler’s veto situation has both a positive
and a negative dimension. Police may have both a positive obligation to
control an audience, or to protect speech, and a negative obligation to not
arrest the speaker, or otherwise suppress the underlying speech. See Cheryl
A. Leanza, Heckler’s Veto Case Law As a Resource for Democratic Discourse,
37 Hofstra L. Rev. 1305, 1306 (2007) (“Heckler’s veto cases justify
compelling (and prohibiting) state action”).

27.

Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 3.

28.

Id. at 5.

29.

Id.

30.

Id. at 4.
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been reacting to, any words uttered inside by Terminiello.31 The disruptive and disorderly conduct of the protesters outside the auditorium
was clearly inspired by Terminiello’s pre-existing reputation and by his
language on other occasions, and was well underway long before
Terminiello even began to speak.32 In any event, the Terminiello Court
sheds little light on issues of permissible provocation, agitation, precipitation, or inducement of a response, and on punishable direct incitement of a criminal response to speech.33
Nor is it clear that the Court’s bracing references to the “high
purpose”34 of free speech, or the value of attacking “prejudices and
preconceptions,”35 relates especially well to much of Terminiello’s actual
language, which involved a combination of antisemitism and recourse
to epithets36 such as “‘slimy scum,’ ‘snakes,’ ‘bedbugs,’ and the like.”37
It would be entirely reasonable to think of Terminiello’s literally dehumanizing, if rhetorical, references as something other than an
attempt to persuade through candid and mutually responsive dialogue.
Nor is the belief, at a literalist level, that one is not reducible to slimy
scum, or to a snake, or to a bedbug, reasonably characterizable as a
“prejudice[] or preconception[]”38 of which one might be disabused
through persuasive speech.
Finally, one might note that the bracing rhetoric39 of the
Terminiello opinion may not seem equally appropriate in all speech
contexts, or even in all sorts of public fora.40 At a minimum, it must be
separately argued that the rhetoric of the Terminiello opinion should
apply to public university contexts, where a range of distinctive values

31.

See id. at 8 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (noting that those outside did not hear
the speech).

32.

See id. at 14–16 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (observing that the protests had begun
even as the speaker arrived).

33.

For historic background, see the attempted distinction by Judge Learned Hand
in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y), rev’d, 246 F. 24
(2d Cir. 1917). Judge Hand’s distinction in Masses was constitutionally restored
in the subversive advocacy case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448
(1969).

34.

Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4.

35.

Id.

36.

Id. at 20–22, 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

37.

Id. at 26.

38.

Id. at 4.

39.

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

40.

See supra note 14 (citing authorities that explore the public forum doctrine).
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are potentially at stake.41 It is far from clear whether the logic and the
rhetoric of the Terminiello opinion should typically apply to public
elementary and high school speech that might well evoke a hostile audience response.42
Less than two years after deciding Terminiello, the Court
reconsidered the interests at stake in the context of heckler’s veto cases
in Feiner v. New York.43 Feiner involved speech promoting a forthcoming meeting and criticizing national and local public officials and
organizations, with a general substantive speech theme of racial equal
rights.44 Feiner’s oration, delivered on a public sidewalk, resulted in his
disorderly conduct conviction,45 ultimately upheld by a divided
Supreme Court.46
Feiner’s speech had drawn a crowd of approximately 75 to 80
listeners, of mixed sympathies, with a police presence consisting of two
officers.47 The crowd presence on the sidewalk and street required some
passing pedestrians to use the street.48 Perhaps more crucially, “[t]he
crowd [became] restless and there was some pushing, shoving and
milling around.”49 Having refused several police requests to cease
speaking, Feiner was arrested for inciting a potential breach of the
peace.50 The Court emphasized the motivation of the arresting officers.
In particular, the officers “were motivated . . . by a proper concern for
the preservation of order and protection of the general welfare,

41.

See generally R. George Wright, Campus Speech and the Functions of the
University, 43 J.C. & U.L. 1 (2017) (explaining the various potentially
conflicting purposes underlying the institution of the modern university
campus).

42.

Consider the distinctive value of elementary student speech that stirs other
elementary school students to anger. But see generally Terminiello, 337 U.S. at
4 (extolling speech that incites anger). For a discussion of political speech and
what is thought to be offensive speech in public school contexts, see infra
Section III.A.

43.

340 U.S. 315 (1951).

44.

Id. at 317.

45.

Id. at 316–18.

46.

The major dissent was authored by Justice Hugo Black. Id. at 321 (Black, J.,
dissenting).

47.

Id. at 316–17 (majority opinion).

48.

Id. at 317.

49.

Id.

50.

Id. at 318.
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and . . . there was no evidence . . . that the acts of the police were a
cover for suppression of petitioner’s views and opinions.”51
Feiner’s arrest was thus said to reflect not police or other official
disapproval of the content or message of his speech,52 but instead,
listener physical reaction to the speech in question.53 The Court
concluded that “[w]hen clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat
to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to
prevent or punish is obvious.”54
There is much to be said in response to the logic of Feiner. Justice
Black’s dissenting opinion—anticipating an eventual scholarly conclusion of Professor Kalven55—notes some of the strategic incentives
established by the majority opinion.56 Thus Justice Black observes that
“[t]he end result . . . is to approve a simple and readily available
technique by which cities and states can with impunity subject all
speeches, political or otherwise . . . to the supervision and censorship of
the local police.”57
In heckler’s veto contexts, the various strategic incentive effects of
the possible rules are indeed crucial. But it should be emphasized that
heckler’s veto cases are not limited to those cases in which some official
authority is itself hostile, or even vaguely unsympathetic, to any message content of the underlying speaker. The often more interesting
heckler’s veto cases are those in which the official authority is neutral
toward—or even sympathetic with—the content of underlying speaker’s

51.

Id. at 319. See also id. at 321 (noting that three New York courts approved the
way in which the police chose to “preserve peace and order”).

52.

Id. at 319–20. Actually, we can think of the crowd spilling out onto the public
street, thereby inconveniencing or endangering pedestrians or vehicle traffic, as
more or less content-neutral grounds for restricting the speech. Crowd
restlessness or disagreement can be considered content-based grounds for
restricting the speech, even if the police and other public officials themselves
had no objection to the content of the speech. See generally R. George Wright,
Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of
a Common Distinction, 60 U. Miami L. Rev. 333, 364 (2006) (discussing the
muddy and arbitrary nature of jurisprudence on the distinction between
content-based and content-neutral actions).

53.

See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 320.

54.

Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)).

55.

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

56.

See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321–29 (Black, J., dissenting).

57.

Id. at 323.
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message, but opts, due to third-party manipulation, to reduce the
perceived risk of violence by somehow silencing the speaker.58
The Feiner majority was reluctant to second guess on-the-scene
choices among alternative police responses to actual or potential
disorder, undertaken in the uncertainties of the moment.59 What Feiner
misses in this regard is that in typical heckler’s veto cases, there will
systematically be advantages of cost, convenience, simplicity, and
conflict avoidance in simply taking the underlying speaker into involuntary custody, whether prosecution of the speaker follows or not. These
systematic advantages are independent of the innocence of the speaker.
In other contexts, the Court has recognized that short-term
considerations of cost, convenience, and simplicity may systematically
outweigh more important long-term values in the minds of local decision
makers.60 In such cases, the governing legal rules should take proper
account of these systematic biases toward choices that may not reflect
the overall, long-term public interest.61 In the Feiner case, only the
dissenting justices showed much interest in a legal presumption that
official silencing of an innocent speaker should be a last resort, undertaken only after all realistic possibilities of controlling disruptive audience behavior have been exhausted.62
Courts in general might choose to disagree with the Feiner majority
on the doctrinal boundaries of illegal incitement, or on constitutionally
mandated presumptions and priorities in maintaining public order. But
it is also possible in this often fact-sensitive area to merely distinguish
the circumstances of Feiner, perhaps through exaggerating the gravity
of the threat to public order therein.63 Later Supreme Court cases have
often drawn upon some mixture of both strategies.
58.

After all, the phenomenon under scrutiny is referred to as that of a heckler’s
veto, rather than as a police veto.

59.

Feiner, 340 U.S. at 319–20.

60.

See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411–13 (1971)
(noting the systematic biases in favor of routing new highway construction
through parkland already owned by the public at the eventual cost of
insufficient remaining parkland, and recognizing a statutory requirement of the
local government’s exhaustion of less environmentally damaging alternatives).

61.

See id. at 413 (“If the statutes [concerning how to select the location of a
highway] are to have any meaning, the Secretary cannot approve the
destruction of parkland unless he finds that alternative routes present unique
problems.”).

62.

See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 326–27 (Black, J., dissenting) (describing a similar
presumption and prioritization among all possible police responses); see also id.
at 330–31 (Douglas & Minton, JJ., dissenting).

63.

See, for example, the classic civil rights case of Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229, 235–37 (1963), in which the Court noted that the threat to the public
order in Feiner was more substantial than under the circumstances of Edwards
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Thus the case Cox v. Louisiana64 refers to a tense and jeering but
non-threatening “small” crowd of onlookers, with 75 to 80 armed police
officers interposing themselves between civil rights demonstrators and
the largely hostile group of onlookers.65 Cox also declares that
“constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to
their assertion or exercise.”66 The problem is that hostility to speech is
often not simple,67 or mere hostility; 68 there may as well be some degree
of potential or actual crowd violence and disorder.
“Mere” audience hostility, thus, presents only the relatively easy
cases. The more difficult cases begin with arrested or otherwise censored
speakers whose opponents credibly threatened or engaged in “unruly”
behavior, or otherwise jeopardized the public order.69 The relatively
speech-protective cases, following Terminiello,70 choose to protect
speech by legally innocent speakers, at least as against some limited
degree of otherwise controllable disorderliness on the part of hostile
onlookers.71 Degrees of potential violence, and the degree of greater or
lesser controllability of such violence by less speech-restrictive means,
will in many cases be fairly debatable.
This brief survey of some of the classic Supreme Court cases
provides an initial sense of some of the basic features of heckler’s veto
scenarios. Not surprisingly, though, many of the most interesting disputes over the nature, status, and scope of a heckler’s veto arise outside
the context of Supreme Court cases. The Part below turns to some
given the absence of any threats of violence, and the presence of ample police
protection.
64.

379 U.S. 536 (1965).

65.

Id. at 550. See also id. at 551 (analogizing the circumstances in this case to
those in Edwards and seeking to distinguish Feiner); supra note 63 and
accompanying text.

66.

Cox, 379 U.S. at 551 (quoting Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535).

67.

See, e.g., Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992)
(noting that “[s]peech cannot be . . . punished or banned, simply because it
might offend a hostile mob”).

68.

See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir. 1978) (“[M]ere public
intolerance or animosity cannot be the basis for abridgement
of . . . constitutional freedoms.” (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611, 615 (1971)).

69.

Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111–12 (1969).

70.

See supra notes 23–42 and accompanying text.

71.

See, e.g., Gregory, 394 U.S at 111–13. The Gregory case did not specify whether
taking the speaker into protective custody would be constitutionally
impermissible if that course of action were deemed genuinely necessary to
prevent some greater likelihood or greater severity of violence and disorder on
the part of hostile onlookers.
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recent lower-court cases that raise—even though they do not satisfactorily resolve—important issues bearing upon the idea of a heckler’s
veto.

II. The Nature and Scope of the Heckler’s Veto: Some
Emerging Judicial Issues
Recent case law has explored heckler’s veto scenarios in which any
form of legal absolutism—whether of speakers’ rights or of public
safety—may seem misplaced. One recent case, Bible Believers v. Wayne
County,72 recognizes that particular circumstances may constrain familiar doctrine and any simplistic responses in heckler’s veto cases.
The Bible Believers en banc majority recognized that what it judged
to be an unconstitutional heckler’s veto could indeed be “reimagined
and repackaged”73 as the protection of members of the public, or even
the protection of the underlying speaker, from impending physical
harm.74 The majority avoided an unrealistic absolutism by prioritizing,
but only presumptively, the ability to speak. Thus “before removing
the speaker due to safety concerns, . . . the police must first make bona
fide efforts to protect the speaker from the crowd’s hostility by other,
less restrictive means.”75 Any police restriction of otherwise legitimate
speech was then held to be properly subjected to a familiar constitutional test of strict scrutiny, under which the police may advance
compelling public safety ends “by using only those means that are the
least restrictive with respect to the speaker’s First Amendment
rights.”76
Significantly, the Bible Believers court recognized that there are
circumstances in which a police restriction of otherwise protected
speech may pass the strict scrutiny test. Thus, for example, if overwhelmed police officers “must retreat due to risk of injury, then retreat
would be warranted.”77 One problem, though, is that the number of
police officers on the scene may itself reflect political biases and prior
official strategic calculation. Officially, disfavored speakers cannot generally be charged fees in proportion to the supposed likelihood of hostile
72.

805 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). This case involved a Christian group’s
proselytizing at a large annual Arab International Festival focusing on cultural
exchange. The Festival was open to the general public on temporarily closed
public streets of Dearborn, Michigan. Id. at 234–35.

73.

Id. at 255.

74.

Id.

75.

Id.

76.

Id. at 253.

77.

Id.
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onlooker outbursts.78 But local authorities could, on the other hand,
consciously provide inadequate numbers of crowd-control officers,
thereby increasing the likelihood of disorder, and the likelihood that
censoring the underlying speaker will then seem reasonably necessary
to preserve public safety. Many official judgments as to such necessity—
unavoidably dependent upon speculation as to the likely effectiveness
of alternative police responses—will be readily contestable.
An important further complication involves the relationship between a heckler’s veto and the broad legal category known as contentbased restrictions on speech.79 It is often thought that all content-based
restrictions on political speech should be tested by judicial strict scrutiny,80 quite apart from whether the circumstances involve any threat
to public safety. It is also often thought that all heckler’s veto cases
involve content-based restrictions on speech.81 Whether a heckler’s veto
of speech should be tested by strict scrutiny may thus depend on how
narrowly or broadly content-based restrictions of speech are defined.
The problem with classifying all heckler’s veto cases as involving
content-based restrictions on the underlying speech is that any such
broad generalizations ignore arguably relevant differences in official
motives. Some heckler’s veto cases involve hostility to the underlying
speech on the part of some audience members along with active or passive hostility of the relevant government officials.82 Government disapproval of the ideas subjected to a heckler’s veto, where the government is motivated in some degree by its own disapproval of the
78.

See generally Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–36.

79.

See generally Wright, supra note 52; R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and
Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A Distinction That Is No Longer Worth
the Fuss, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 2081 (2015).

80.

While the precise contours and limits of the majority opinion are unclear, this
is the general thrust of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27
(2015).

81.

See, e.g., Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d
780, 787 (9th Cir. 2008) (“If the statute . . . would allow or disallow speech
depending on the reaction of the audience, then the ordinance would run afoul
of an independent species of prohibitions on content-restrictive regulations,
often described as a First Amendment-based ban on the ‘heckler’s veto’.”);
Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 200 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A heckler’s
veto is an impermissible content-based restriction on speech where the speech
is prohibited due to an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction of the
audience.”); Rosenbaum v. City & Cty. of S.F., 484 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir.
2007)( A ‘‘heckler’s veto’’ is an impermissible content-based speech restriction
where the speaker is silenced due to an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction
of the audience.).

82.

Consider, for example, that a hypothetical early 1960s civil rights march focused
on the injustice of officially endorsed public policies.

170

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017
The Heckler's Veto Today

underlying speech, would present a relatively clear case of a contentbased restriction of speech.83
But not all heckler’s veto cases need involve any government disapproval of the underlying speech. The courts often hold that audience
reaction—as distinct from any official reaction84—to the underlying
speech is crucial to heckler’s veto cases.85 On this basis, one could easily
argue that a heckler’s veto case could involve the government’s complete ignorance of, indifference to, or even support of the message of the
underlying speaker.
Imagine a case in which the relevant government strongly supports
the underlying message, as when a speaker wishes to endorse the reelection of the incumbent officials. With great reluctance, the government restricts this favored message because of its inability to control a
hostile audience of such speech. The government’s restriction of the
speech could be classified as content-based, but at the price of ignoring
that the government’s views and the speaker’s views are in perfect
alignment.
A heckler’s veto case could also be thought of as one in which the
government is completely unware of the content of the speaker’s message, but must restrict the speech in question in order to prevent or
minimize bystander injuries. Society might wish to apply strict scrutiny
in some, or all, such cases. But one could also sensibly say that such
speech restrictions are content-based only in a very broad and extended
sense, in which government disapproval, or awareness, of the message
is entirely absent.86
83.

See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226–27 (discussing the requirement of contentneutrality and categories of content-based laws that require strict scrutiny).

84.

Of course, sufficient police or other governmental action or inaction is necessary
for a classic heckler’s veto case. An audience’s physical attack on the speaker
would presumably silence the speech, amounting to a literal and direct heckler’s
veto. But classic heckler’s veto cases involve First Amendment-based challenges
to official action or inaction, and thus require sufficient state action. For
background on the state action requirement, see, for example, Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that in a corporation-owned town the
corporation cannot restrict fundamental liberties and enforce this restriction by
application of a state statute).

85.

See, e.g., Santa Monica Nativity Scenes Comm. v. City of Santa Monica, 784
F.3d 1286, 1293 (9th Cir. 2015) (referring to the “listeners’ actual or anticipated
hostility”); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 533 F.3d at 787 (allowing or
disallowing speech “depending on the reaction of the audience”); Startzell, 533
F.3d at 200 (stating that a heckler’s veto occurs “where the speech is prohibited
due to an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction of the audience”);
Rosenbaum, 484 F.3d at 1158 (stating that a heckler’s veto occurs “where the
speaker is silenced due to an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction of the
audience”).

86.

For an example of a court’s unwillingness to apply heckler’s veto doctrine in
the absence of any police knowledge of, agreement with, or disagreement with
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The nature, status, and limits of a heckler’s veto—and of proper
judicial responses thereto—are contestable in other basic respects as
well. It is, for example, unclear whether the idea of a heckler’s veto
should be extended to cover subconscious government motivations and
decisions well in advance of the speech in question.87 There is no present
audience at the time of such decisions, and no audience, hostile or otherwise, may ultimately form.
Relatedly, it is also debatable whether a heckler’s veto can be
imposed through a broad, standing legislative enactment, as opposed to
a narrower restriction on particular instances of speech.88 Legislative
heckler’s vetoes might thus be imposed years in advance of any relevant
speech. As well, one might argue that the heckler’s veto doctrine should
apply not only to pure speech,89 and to symbolic speech or to mixed
speech and conduct,90 but as well to the politically controversial exercise
of one’s constitutional rights through pure conduct.91
The scope of the heckler’s veto doctrine has also been variously
contested in contexts of government, as opposed to private party,
speech;92 an individual’s refusal to pay a government assessment aimed

the message of either the speaker or the speaker’s opponents, see Rosenbaum,
484 F.3d at 1159 (explaining that there is no heckler’s veto if there is no
evidence of official awareness of or response to anyone’s views, as distinct from
merely an unacceptable noise level).
87.

See e.g., Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–36,
(analyzing speech permit fees imposed well in advance of any speech or reaction
thereto by any future audience).

88.

Compare Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining
that most heckler’s vetoes are imposed legislatively, and in response to
“majority sensibilities,” as distinct from administratively, and in response to
“the sensibilities of a minority”) with Santa Monica Nativity Scenes, 784 F.3d
at 1293–94 (discussing repeated efforts to confine the scope of heckler’s veto
cases to restriction of particular speakers or of particular speech). Of course,
who counts as a “majority” or as a “minority” in heckler’s veto cases will often
be subject to dispute, depending partly on the breadth of what one takes to be
the relevant background population or background circumstances.

89.

See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949) (discussing the fact
that freedom of speech, without action, that provokes a negative response may
still be protected under the First Amendment).

90.

See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (analyzing whether
burning a draft card is a protected form of symbolic speech).

91.

See, e.g., Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 795-96 (8th Cir. 2008), (discussing
whether protesters picketing in front of a Planned Parenthood office constituted
a heckler’s veto of protected conduct).

92.

See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (quoting
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting))(“To govern, government has to say something, and a First

172

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017
The Heckler's Veto Today

at an industry’s well-being;93 children’s misperceptions of otherwise appropriate government accommodation of religion94 or of indecent
Internet speech;95 and in the case of an employer’s racial discrimination
in order to accommodate racial prejudices in the labor force.96 The sheer
variety of putative heckler’s veto cases is thus remarkable.
The aim herein is not to take sides on any of the above unresolved
issues as to the nature, status, and scope of the heckler’s veto, or on
the proper judicial responses to heckler’s veto cases. This Article’s aim
is instead to document such unresolved conflicts,97 and then to suggest
that the United States is unlikely to arrive at any consensual resolution
of many of the most significant such conflicts, and to explain the consensual, unsolvable nature of such conflicts.98 Progress toward achieving
these aims can best be made by attending to important putative
heckler’s veto issues in various more or less concrete and familiar educational contexts. Part III thus examines contested understandings of
the idea of a heckler’s veto in public education cases immediately below.

III. The Heckler’s Veto in the American Educational
System
A. The Public School Context

The image of a well-functioning public school classroom may seem
distant from the violence, disorder, and threats to public safety manifested in the classic heckler’s veto case of Terminiello.99 But the leading
Amendment heckler’s veto of any forced contribution to raising the
government’s voice in the ‘marketplace of ideas’ would be out of the question.”).
93.

See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 468 (considering the necessity of some form of
government speech inevitably supported in some way by taxes or exactions).

94.

See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (referring
to a possible “modified heckler’s veto . . . on the basis of what the youngest
members of the audience might misperceive”).

95.

See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997) (striking down the federal
Communications Decency Act).

96.

See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798 (1998) (opining on the
hypothetical situation in which an employer might discriminate in job
assignments in deference to prejudice amongst the employees). Even more
broadly, it has been said that “any lawsuit that stops the government from
doing something that the majority wants can be labeled a ‘heckler’s veto.’”
Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Church and State Should Be Separate, 49 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 2193, 2213 (2008).

97.

See infra Part III.

98.

See infra notes 161–175 and accompanying text.

99.

See supra notes 23–42 and accompanying text.
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public school free speech case, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,100 explicitly links these two contexts.
The Tinker case involved a black armband Vietnam War protest
by high school students.101 The Court held that even in the public high
school context, mere “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”102
Similarly, “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint”103 will not suffice to
restrict such speech.104 More concrete evidence that the restricted speech
would “materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school”105 is instead
required.106 Otherwise put, school officials must have “reason to
anticipate”107 that the speech to be restricted “would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other
students.”108
Of special interest for the purposes of this Article is the Tinker
Court’s explicit reference to the heckler’s veto logic of Terminiello. The
Tinker Court declares in particular:
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus,
that deviates from the views of another person may start an
argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we
must take this risk . . . and our history says that it is this sort of
hazardous freedom . . . that is the basis of our national
strength . . . in this relatively permissive, often disputatious,
society.109

As for the requirement that we take the risk in question, the Tinker
Court cites the heckler’s veto case of Terminiello.110
100. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
101. Id. at 504.
102. Id. at 508.
103. Id. at 509.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quotation omitted).
106. See id. (finding no such interference in Tinker).
107. Id.
108. Id. The nature, scope, and necessary weight of any such rights were
understandably left unspecified in Tinker.
109. Id. at 508–09.
110. Id. at 508. The Tinker Court did not specify any particular passages from the
Terminiello opinion.
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The anticipated reaction to the black-armband protest in Tinker
presumably fell short of a Terminiello-like rock-throwing mob. Thus,
the Tinker Court need not have embraced Terminiello to the fullest
extent. It is clear that the Tinker standards regarding student speech
actually fall short of protecting otherwise appropriate student speech
as against imminent or actual rock-throwing.111
What is less clear, however, is whether Tinker always protects
otherwise permissible school speech against less extreme forms of what
might be considered an attempted heckler’s veto. Hostile reaction to
actual or anticipated speech need not take the form of violent rockthrowing. It has been judicially held in non-school contexts that there
is no exception in the case of an audience of minors from the general
rule against judicially validating a heckler’s veto.112 In the public school
case law, though, the permissibility of what is claimed to be a heckler’s
veto has been vigorously disputed.113
Thus in the student-speech context, it has been argued that “the
government cannot silence a speaker because of how an audience might
react to the speech,”114 and that this principle is simply the heckler’s
veto doctrine.115 The choice is said to be between ignoring possible
audience reactions to speech and permitting “the will of the mob to rule
our schools.”116

111. See supra notes 102–108 and accompanying text (describing the requirements
of Tinker and noting that permitting actual rock-throwing in a school
environment presumably would be disruptive and interfere with the normal
disciplinary processes of the school).
112. See Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sherrif Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780,
790 (declining to create a minors exception to the heckler’s veto when antiabortion activists displayed images of aborted fetuses across from a middle
school).
113. See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 766–67 (9th Cir.
2014) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing
that in allowing the heckler’s veto in schools, the majority “creates a split with
the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits and permits the will of the mob to rule our
schools”). See also Katherine M. Portner, Tinker’s Timeless Teaching: Why the
Heckler’s Veto Should Not Be Allowed in Public Schools, 86 Miss. L.J. 409
(2017) (discussing the circuit split on the heckler’s veto in the context of public
schools).
114. Dariano, 767 F.3d at 766 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
115. Id.
116. Id. More generally, the O’Scannlain dissent relies on Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie
School District, 636 F.3d 874, 876 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting the otherwise realistic
incentives with regard to offensive speech), and Holloman ex rel. Holloman v.
Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1259, 1294–95 (11th Cir. 2004) (protecting the symbolic
speech of holding up a fist rather than reciting the Pledge of Allegiance). See
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It is of course possible to argue that there are intermediate
alternatives between ignoring possible audience responses, regardless of
their likelihood, severity, motivation, degree of calculation, or reasonableness, and incentivizing mob rule and the intimidation of innocent
speakers. On the other hand, most relevant school speech cases actually
do not seem to be especially interested in whether school authorities
have explored, or have reasonably exhausted, the possibilities of avoiding violence by warning, reasonably deterring, or somehow restraining
potential opponents of the speech in question.117 There are, for example,
a number of appellate cases involving the wearing or display of
Confederate flag regalia in public schools.118 Most such cases do not
seem to require that school officials exhaust all realistic possibilities of
deterring audience violence before restricting the underlying speech.119
The Confederate flag cases may well illustrate the limits to a fullfledged speech-protective heckler’s veto doctrine in the public school
speech context. Tinker itself does not seem to require that the school
explore the effectiveness of, say, temporarily reassigning supervisory
administrative staff where there may be a substantial risk of disruption
by counter-protesters. Nor, one might argue, should the law require
such steps. For one thing, Tinker allows for student speech restrictions
not merely given the likelihood of substantial disruption,120 but also to
prevent violation of the rights of other students.121 One thus might well
Dariano, 767 F.3d at 771–72 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
117. See supra notes 60–62; Dariano, 767 F.3d at 768 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The panel claims that the source of the
threatened violence is irrelevant: apparently requiring school officials to stop
the source of a threat is too burdensome when a more ‘readily-available’ solution
is at hand . . . namely, silencing the target of the threat.”).
118. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 438 (4th Cir. 2013); DeFoe ex
rel. DeFoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 335–36 (6th Cir. 2010); A.M. ex rel. McAllum
v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 222–23 (5th Cir. 2009); B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch.
Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 739 (8th Cir. 2009); Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 566–67
(6th Cir. 2008); Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cty., 324 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th
Cir. 2003); Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cty., 218 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir.
2000); West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000).
119. See supra note 118.
120. See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Again, the Tinker Court
understandably did not undertake an analysis of which sorts of rights-claims
might suffice in such cases. For limited further discussion, see Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274–76 (1988), in which the Court focused on
family and personal privacy rights, and did not require a more narrowly-tailored
alternative restriction than simply refusing to print the two newspaper articles
in question.
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argue for a public school student’s right against the officially approved
display, by one’s fellow students, of Confederate flag images.
If, however, one were to find no such right, it is still unclear that
Tinker would uphold a student speech right to display a Confederate
flag. The scope of reasonable adverse reactions by students to such
displays may not be confinable to mere discomfort or displeasure.122
Fundamental dignity concerns are not exhausted by considerations of
mere discomfort or mere displeasure. Evocation of the Confederacy, in
these public school contexts, may provoke more than abstract disagreement, and the emotions associated with mere abstract disagreements.123
Not all significant student audience reactions to such displays may be
visible. Crucially, even in the absence of any likely violent response,
such displays may, in Tinker’s language, “substantially interfere with
the work of the school.”124 The work of the school, after all, involves
allowing all students to equally concentrate, without distraction, on
basic educational matters, and on inculcating responsible citizenship in
a pluralistic society.
One might wonder about the permissible display of Confederate
flags in schools in which there are relatively few minorities. But there
is something perverse about more stringently protecting speech that
distinctly targets groups who are too clearly outnumbered to be physically disruptive. One might explain this in terms of some relevant right
of the outnumbered targeted group.125 But it is again equally arguable
that prohibiting typical Confederate flag clothing displays meets
Tinker’s requirements by preventing interference with the work of the
schools.126
The important tasks assigned to public schools are multiple, and
not always fully compatible.127 The work of the public schools, for
Tinker’s purposes, is arguably broad. Even as of the time of Brown v.
122. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
123. For the underexplored idea of words which by their very utterance inflict
judicially cognizable injury, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942). Presumably, the point of excepting words “which by their very
utterance inflict injury,” is to cover cases in which the target of the speech is
not likely under the circumstances to respond violently. Id.
124. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
125. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (listing cases addressing school bans
on clothing with the Confederate flag and the requirement from Tinker that
the ban prevents speech that “substantially interfere[s] with the work of the
school”).
127. See generally R. George Wright, Post-Tinker, 10 Stan. J.C.R. & C.L. 1
(2014) (discussing the various purposes and values of schools and how “Tinkerprotected speech” may serve some purposes while negating other values).
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Board of Education,128 the Court had recognized the importance of public school education to the construction and maintenance of a functioning democratic society.129 In the language of Brown, education “is a
principle instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing [the child] for later professional training, and in helping [the
child] to adjust normally to [the child’s] environment.”130 Presumably,
this applies equally to all public school students.
It is certainly arguable that, at a minimum, a public school could
prohibit typical displays of Confederate flags. Whatever the consciously
intended meanings of such displays, they could be interpreted as
interfering with the basic socialization functions of the schools. On this
view, such displays could reasonably be said to substantially interfere
with the work of the school,131 even, and indeed especially, if minority
representation at the particular school is quite limited. In such cases,
one might well argue that Tinker’s requirements for restricting speech—
even on the basis of the speech’s content132—have been met.
On this possible analysis, typical restrictions on student speech in
schools aimed at protecting the school’s ability to carry out one or more
of its basic functions would not reflect a heckler’s veto as the idea of a
heckler’s veto is often understood. But it is also clear that any such
analysis is deeply contested even at the level of the federal appellate
courts.133 The idea of a heckler’s veto, including its meaning, status, and
scope, is here again fundamentally disputed.
The meaning and scope of a heckler’s veto is even more
conspicuously and essentially disputed in the context of public and private university campuses. Arguable heckler’s veto cases in higher
education contexts deserve separate attention. This Article attends to
such cases immediately below.
B. The University Speech Context

Of late, the question of a heckler’s veto, at least as rather loosely
defined, has arisen conspicuously on a number of public and private
128. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
129. See id. at 493 (“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance
of education to democratic society.”).
130. Id.
131. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
132. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27 (2015) (discussing when
regulations on speech are considered content-based and are thus subject to strict
scrutiny).
133. See supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text.
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university campuses. In such cases, the speaker may be either associated
with the university in some capacity, or an outsider to the campus. One
perspective on such cases, by University of California-Berkeley
Chancellor Nicholas Dirks, illustrates one controversial dimension of the
heckler’s veto policy conflict.134 Chancellor Dirks declares in particular
that “[w]hile the school remains absolutely committed to ensuring that
all points of view can be voiced and heard, we cannot compromise the
physical safety of our students and guests in the process.”135
It may be possible to reconcile these two apparently conflicting
goals, but only through certain essentially and persistently controversial
definitions and assumptions. In the apparently straightforward
declaration by Professor Richard Epstein that “[w]henever speech
inspires violence, it should be shut down.”136 This formulation requires
a satisfactory account of what amounts to “inspiring”137 or perhaps directly inciting violence, and as well of what counts as sufficient
‘violence’ in this context. The latter inquiry must consider whether the
categories of speech and violence are themselves mutually exclusive.
The broader point is that any view of any such matter is, in American
culture, readily and sustainably contested.
The university-speech context in general highlights a number of
distinctive and intractable heckler’s veto problems. Should some instances of de-platforming138 a potential speaker, disinviting a speaker,
or non-platforming such a speaker at some earlier stage, count as the
134. Nicholas Dirks, Berkeley Is Under Attack From Both Sides, N.Y. Times
(Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/opinion/berkeley-isunder-attack-from-both-sides.html [https://perma.cc/WZ76-QMF7].
135. Id.
136. Richard A. Epstein, Mob Censorship on Campus, Hoover Institution
(Mar. 13, 2017), www.hoover.org/research/mob-censorship-campus [https://
perma.cc/ZS7Z-3GN6]. See Nwanguma v. Trump, No. 3:16-cv-247-DJH, 2017 WL
1234152, at *3 (W.D. KY Mar. 31, 2017) (seeking to link criminal incitement to
the concepts of provoking, stirring up, persuading, specific advocacy, and either
explicit or implicit encouragement; apparently endorsing a relatively broad
understanding of incitement, even in a speech context).
137. Epstein, supra note 136. See also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
138. For background on the complex phenomenon of university speaker deplatforming, and related analyses of controversial speakers, see, for example,
Sarah Bell, NUS ‘Right to Have No Platform Policy’, BBC (Apr. 25, 2016),
www.bbc.com/news/education-36101423
[https://perma.cc/S9WY-UJQ7]
(noting the popularity among students of some such no-platform policies with
regard to speaker access to student union premises). For example in the
American context, see Aaron R. Hanlon, Why Colleges Have a Right to Reject
Hateful Speakers Like Ann Coulter, New Republic (Apr. 24, 2017),
https://newrepublic.com/article/142218/colleges-right-reject [https://perma.
cc/68AA-MF9V] (discussing the logistical reality of inviting speakers to campus
and the sometimes erroneous narrative of how and why dis-invitations occur).

179

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017
The Heckler's Veto Today

exercise of an early stage heckler’s veto? Or are such cases instead mere
unavoidable reflections of a necessary, and occasionally awkward,139
multi-stage process of selection from a broad pool of potential campus
speakers, not all of whom deserve legitimization140 by association with
the university? Gatekeeping of university speakers on the basis of the
perceived value of their earlier or anticipated speech seems inevitable.
Thus it has been argued:
No-platforming may look like censorship from certain angles, but
from others it’s a consequence of a challenging, never-ending
process occurring at virtually all levels of the university: deciding
what educational material to present to our students and what to
leave out. In this sense, de-platforming isn’t censorship; it’s a
product of free expression and the foundational aims of a
classically liberal education.141

It is hardly surprising, given the variety of “angles”142 available, that
the appropriateness of no-platforming and other forms of what some see
as a complex, multistage, institutionalized heckler’s veto is contested.
Nor is it possible to consensually resolve campus heckler’s veto cases
by classifying some audience reactions to actual or potential speech, or
to the speakers in question, as either reasonable and appropriate, or
else as merely hypersensitive and therefore unworthy of official
validation. Analogous battles have long been waged, inconclusively, in
the Establishment Clause context over whether particular adverse
reactions to religious speech in public places should be classified as

139. A loosely parallel set of problems arise in the traditional public school library
context, in which non-required library books may inevitably be ordered without
meaningful scrutiny for appropriateness, and some thereafter removed as
educationally unsuitable. See Bd. of Educ. Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870–72 (1982) (plurality opinion).
140. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and
Legitimation, 57 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 375, 377 (2006) (citing the
understanding of legitimacy as a generalized belief “that the actions of an entity
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of
norms, values, beliefs and definitions”); Cathryn Johnson et al., Legitimacy as
a Social Process, 32 Ann. Rev. Soc. 53, 57 (2006) (discussing the social
processes underlying the establishment of legitimacy). For a surprising
argument linking the permissibility of explicitly bigoted speech to political
legitimacy, see Ronald Dworkin, Even Bigots and Holocaust Deniers Must Have
Their Say, The Guardian (Feb. 13, 2006), www.theguardian.com/
world/2006/Feb/14/muhammadcartoons.comment
[https://perma.cc/VRJ7FEA3].
141. Hanlon, supra note 138.
142. Id.
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merely hypersensitive or excessive.143 We should expect no greater
consensus in the campus speech context.
A further dimension of inconclusiveness in the campus heckler’s
veto cases involves the contested notion of “violence.” The basic
problem here is that the scope of the idea of “violence” is not invariably
confined to something like the direct application of physical force144 or
the immediate threat thereof, whether by dominant groups or by subordinated groups and insurgents.145 Typologies of violence have in some
cases incorporated ideas of structural, systemic, or symbolic violence,
beyond the conspicuous, dramatic outbursts of sheer physical violence
that more commonly seize public attention.146
In the campus speech context in particular, the idea of discursive
violence, or violence inflicted via speech, has clearly been raised.147
Roughly, discursive violence may involve language that discounts or
dismisses personal or group experiences and sensibilities, even when
143. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 859 (7th Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (Hamilton, J., concurring) (discussing the link between audience
hypersensitivity with obtuseness and unreasonableness); Nurre v. Whitehead,
580 F.3d 1087, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009) (Smith, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part) (deploring presumed audience hypersensitivity); Books v.
Elkhart Cty., 401 F.3d 857, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (purporting to distinguish “an
objective, reasonable person standard” from “the standpoint of the
hypersensitive or easily offended”) (citing, inter alia, Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring));
Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 165 (5th Cir. 1991) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting) (“Only through sensitivity to the nonadherent can we effect the
constitutional values inherent in the Religion Clauses. . . . Yet, by insisting that
the test be an objective one—a ‘reasonable nonadherent’ test—the endorsement
inquiry retains the ability to discount the perceptions of a hypersensitive
plaintiff.”). For a series of doubts as to the value of references to ‘objectivity’
in this and many other legal contexts, see R. George Wright, Objective and
Subjective Tests in the Law, 16 N.H. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017).
144. See Hannah Arendt, On Violence 4 (1970) (distinguishing the idea of
violence from the ideas of force and power).
145. Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence 277 (T.E. Hulme & J. Roth
trans., The Free Press 1950) (1919).
146. See, e.g., Etienne Balibar, Violence and Civility: On the Limits of
Political Philosophy 83 (2015); Richard J. Bernstein, Violence:
Thinking Without Banisters 176–77 (2013) (distinguishing among legal,
structural, symbolic, totalitarian, and physical violence); Slavoj Žižek,
Violence: Six Sideways Reflections 1–2 (2008) (distinguishing subjective
violence “embodied in language,” systemic violence exerted by “the smooth
functioning of our economic and political systems,” and objective violence that
is “invisible” in that it is incorporated into our baseline from which other forms of
violence may be measured as a departure).
147. See, e.g., Jade Schiff, Violence Requires Multiple Definitions, Oberlin Rev.
(May 1, 2015), https://oberlinreview.org/8174/opinions/violence-requiresmultiple-definitions [https://perma.cc/AGW6-KCC6].
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those experiences and sensibilities may seem fundamental and wellgrounded in history and culture.148 Language, with no additional physical component, can clearly inflict meaningful injury.149 Thus words that
are thought to deny fundamental core experiences—and thus to
dehumanize—are said to pose a direct danger to vulnerable targets of
the speech in question.150 On such a view, a heckler’s veto of such speech
may, at worst, respond to one kind of violence with another.
Of course, it is also possible to legally discount or dismiss target or
audience responses to such dismissive speech.151 The resulting sustained
debate re-inscribes the unresolved conflict over what should count as
audience “hypersensitivity.”152 The status of discursive violence, to
which a heckler’s veto, at some stage, might be a legitimate response,
is clearly a continuing and unresolved debate.
Thus on a broad understanding, “[t]o do violence is to carry out an
intention to behave in a manner likely to cause harm.”153 Such a view
is certainly not without respectable historical support. Consider the
observations of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen,154 a well-respected

148. See id.
149. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Mari J.
Matsuda et al., Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory,
Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment 1 (1993); Ulrich Baer,
What ‘Snowflakes’ Get Right About Free Speech, N.Y. Times (Apr. 24, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/opinion/what-liberal-snowflakes-getright-about-free-speech.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/6YXV-5HSU].
150. See Jonathan Haidt, Intimidation Is the New Normal on Campus, Chron.
Higher Educ. (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.dartblog.com/image/Intimid
ation%20Is%20the%20New%20Normal%20--%20Jon%20Haidt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BTR9-3Q2B].
151. Id.
152. See supra note 143.
153. Barry L. Gan, Violence and Nonviolence: An Introduction 19
(2013) (emphasis omitted). Note that this definition does not require that the
speaker in question specifically intend the objectively likely harm. See also
Lisa Feldman Barrett, When Is Speech Violence?, N.Y. TIMES (July 14,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/opinion/sunday/when-isspeech-violence.html [https://perma.cc/K25A-9Z8X] (seeking to distinguish the
adverse physical stress effects of abusive speech from those of merely offensive
speech). But see, Jonathan Haidt & Greg Lukianoff, Why It’s a Bad Idea to
Tell Students Words Are Violence, THE ATLANTIC (July 18, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/07/why-its-a-bad-idea-totell-students-words-are-violence/533970 [https://perma.cc/4C2F-CFSV] (arguing
that banning stress-inducing speakers from college campuses will not make
students safer).
154. James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity 121–22
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1991) (1874).
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Victorian critic of the free-speech theory of John Stuart Mill.155
Fitzjames Stephen interestingly argues that treating someone’s opinions
as false or denying the meaningfulness of such opinions “may cause
intense pain, and this may be of many different kinds . . . .”156 In
Fitzjames Stephen’s view, causing this intense pain is, crucially, an infringement of that person’s own “liberty of thought.”157
In sum, there is a sustained, undeniable lack of consensus on
whether a heckler’s veto can be a legitimate policy response to speech
that is itself thought to embody violence, or that itself restricts in some
measure the freedom of thought of the targets of such speech. Here
again, there will be no voluntary consensus.158
Someone might be tempted to say, though, that at least if society
could somehow set all these controversies aside, any heckler’s veto of
any controversial campus speaker, and any associated intimidation or
deterrence of speech, must necessarily diminish the institution of free
speech overall. This may seem intuitively clear, if not true merely by
definition.
However, even this view is easily and persistently contested.
Especially in the case of reasonably well-known outside speakers, one
or more exercises of a heckler’s veto typically does not meaningfully
restrict the speaker’s realistic ability to convey their ideas to any relevant audience. Most, if not all, such speakers will retain perfectly
adequate alternative channels, including social media, through which to
convey their message to any interested persons.159 And in some cases,
the publicity associated with the presumed heckler’s veto will clearly
155. See generally John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed.,
Penguin Books 1974) (1859).
156. Stephens, supra note 154, at 121.
157. Id. at 121–22.
158. In the context of at least some forms of pain, fear, and violence, see Robert M.
Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1629 (1986) (“[A]s long as
legal interpretation is constitutive of violent behavior as well as meaning, as
long as people are committed to using or resisting the social organizations of
violence in making their interpretations real, there will always be a tragic limit
to the common meaning that can be achieved.”).
159. See, e.g., Hanlon, supra note 138 (stating that “[o]bviously, students can read,
watch, and hear professional provocateurs like [Ann] Coulter without an
institution of higher education hosting her speech); Baer, supra note 149
(“Universities invite speakers not chiefly to present otherwise unavailable
discoveries, but to present to the public views they have presented elsewhere.”).
For a broad discussion of why judicial review of free speech cases should consider
the value of the speakers options to disseminate their message before and after
the regulation on speech, see R. George Wright, The Unnecessary Complexity
of Free Speech Law and the Central Importance of Alternative Speech
Channels, 9 Pace L. Rev. 57 (1989).
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draw increased public attention, over time, to the speaker or the
message at issue.160 It is thus entirely contestable whether the university
campus heckler’s veto must necessarily result in overall damage to the
institution of free speech, even if the speech rights of those targeted by
the speech in question are set aside.

Conclusion
Reluctance to let a speaker’s opponents suppress the speech in
question directly or indirectly through their own violence seems to be
reflected in the law. American society seems in particular to be reluctant to encourage or to incentivize161 violence in the place of dialogue.
But as shown in the classic Supreme Court cases,162 and in more recent
appellate case law in the contexts of public school education163 and
university campus speech,164 Americans continue to be far from
agreement on most of the interesting elements of definition, scope, and
value in purported heckler’s veto cases.
This may seem a curious state of affairs. After all, there is nothing
finally at stake or ultimately decided merely in how the idea of a
heckler’s veto is defined, or other preliminary issues. Why can’t the
adherents of the more fundamental substantive legal or political doctrines involved stipulate to any reasonable understanding of the
meaning of a heckler’s veto, and then argue, on that reasonable basis,
the substantive merits of their political or legal positions? It seems
160. See Hanlon, supra note 138. Presumably most instances in which persons feel
intimidated from speaking candidly have little to do with any form of a heckler’s
veto as discussed above. In any event there is also the counter-balancing
possibility that a heckler’s veto could be used disproportionately against those
lacking the institutional political strength to defend their basic interests. See,
e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, Words Which By Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury,
Atlantic (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2017/04/words-which-by-their-very-utterance-inflict-injury/523344/
[https://perma.cc/5PWV-8ESY].
161. It is thought that some approaches to the disruption of speech incentivize
disruptive violence, and in effect provide a legal roadmap of how to silence
disfavored speakers. See, e.g., Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 274
(6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Rogers, J., dissenting). It is, however, equally
arguable that more broadly protecting speech against a heckler’s veto provides
a corresponding legal roadmap to engaging in harmful, assaultive, or in some
sense itself violent speech. See supra notes 149–158 and accompanying text
(discussing that speech, even without conduct, can inflict harm); Collin v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding city ordinances unconstitutional
in the historic Illinois Nazi demonstration case).
162. See supra Section II.
163. See supra Section III.A.
164. See supra Section III.B.
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implausible to suppose that in the case of every legal concept, the bare
definition of the concept decisively steers, if it does not actually dictate,
case outcomes on the merits.
The full explanation for the various ongoing conceptual struggles
over the scope, status, and meaning of a heckler’s veto, doubtlessly
includes various inseparable causal strands.165 But it is worth calling
attention to what seems to be one increasingly important cultural
circumstance. This circumstance is, specifically, a general and continuing loss of confidence in our ability, as advocates of whatever legal or
political position may be at stake, to reasonably persuade our
opponents, or to convince those opponents of our substantive views on
the merits. Let us call this general phenomenon reduced forensic confidence.
Given that reduced forensic confidence, this country cannot afford
to settle for any understanding of the very idea of a heckler’s veto that
does not make one’s persuasive task relatively easy, and an opponent’s
persuasive task correspondingly more difficult. We distinctively tend to
lack confidence that from any reasonable preliminary understanding of
the idea of a heckler’s veto, the truth or rightness of our own preferred
policy outcomes will gradually emerge and be widely recognized and
appreciated.
The explanation, in turn, for this widespread contemporary loss of
forensic confidence is also doubtless multi-faceted, and beyond any
rigorous proof. Speculatively, though, a number of specific contemporary circumstances may play a role in the general loss of forensic
confidence in question.
In particular, in an increasingly intensely polarized and mutually
embittered legal and political culture,166 resistance to one’s own views
may be more determined and implacable than it otherwise might be.
Even if differences as to what should count as a heckler’s veto are in
some sense preliminary, there is no guarantee that such differences will
165. See Jim Manzi, What Social Science Does—and Doesn’t—Know, City J.,
https://www.city-journal.org/html/what-social-science-does%E2%80%94anddoesn%E2%80%99t%E2%80%94know-13297.html
[https://perma.cc/6GQUDKLJ] (last visited Oct. 10, 2017).
166. See, e.g., Emily Badger & Niraj Chokshi, How We Became Bitter Political
Enemies, N.Y. Times (June 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/06/15/upshot/how-we-became-bitter-political-enemies.html?mcubz=1
[https://perma.cc/W6RP-K3MH] (identifying trends of increasing political
polarization); see generally Jean M. Twenge, et al., More Polarized but More
Independent: Political Party Identification and Ideological Self-Categorization
Among U.S Adults, College Students, and Late Adolescents, 1970-2015, 42
Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1364 (2016) (identifying a correlation
between early party-identification amongst Millennials and more extreme
ideological self-categorization); Bill Bishop, The Big Sort: Why The
Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart (2009).
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not be magnified, maintained, and exploited to any length by the
partisans involved.167 In matters of law and politics, even apparently
minor or preliminary matters may increasingly seem to be ideologically
inseparable from other, more substantive issues,168 thereby raising the
stakes and the risks in every context. To make even a reasonable
concession as to the bare meaning or the contextual scope of a heckler’s
veto may—under the circumstances of America’s increasingly intensely
polarized politics—appear to leave one at a perhaps permanent
disadvantage. Even if someone believes that history is ultimately on his
or her side,169 that person can hardly be confident that history will involve no painful or disturbing detours or reversals.170
A sense that the stakes, in a given context, have increased, can
under some circumstances clearly promote a reduced level of confidence
in a favorable outcome. Consider, by loose analogy, a hypothetical
parent’s confidence that their child is in the fenced backyard. The
parent may be subjectively confident of the child’s current presence
based on only limited evidence. Now suppose the parent now hears a
report of coyotes in the neighborhood. The report naturally raises the
parent’s level of concern for the child’s safety. Interestingly, such
anxiety-provoking news might also by itself tend to reduce the parent’s
subjective confidence that the child is, in fact, in the fenced backyard.
More directly, though, a reduced confidence in one’s ability to
persuade one’s legal and political opponents, from any reasonable
starting point, may reflect an entirely justified sense that current debate
on legal and political matters commonly tends to be disappointing or
unsatisfactory in its quality. Advocates’ confidence in the cogency and
effectiveness of their arguments may even be limited by a vague sense
that those arguments could somehow be better presented and defended.

167. See Anton Blok, The Narcissism of Minor Differences, 1 Eur. J. Soc.
Theory 33, 33 (1998).
168. This is a matter of increased ideological awareness and attempts at ideological
consistency. For recent trends, see Political Polarization in the American
Public: How Increasing Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect
Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life, Pew Res. Ctr. 1 (June 12, 2014),
http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/06/6-12-2014-Political-PolarizationRelease.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2KW-MFVV].
169. Despite the idea’s apparently deep metaphysical commitments, it is often thought
that the universe is somehow oriented toward some presumably valid
understanding of justice. See The Arc of the Moral Universe Is Long, But It Bends
Toward Justice, Quote Investigator http://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/11/
15/arc-of-universe [https://perma.cc/9ND4-KESD] (last visited Oct. 19, 2017).
170. That any bending toward real justice need not be continuous and uninterrupted
is confirmed as much by our history as by the logic of the concepts involved.
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More typically, though, there is an increasing sense that one’s opponents are, for one reason or another, not fully in a position to appreciate
the cogency of one’s arguments.171
That one’s opponents are sufficiently empathetic, self-critical,
practically wise, and also sufficiently well versed in history, culture,
economics, logic, probability, and statistics to properly appreciate one’s
argument, in the heckler’s veto area or otherwise, will often seem doubtful. Civic ignorance is today often thought to be pervasive and
conspicuous.172 Sufficient cultural competence or cultural literacy,173 and
critical-thinking-ability sufficient to follow and genuinely appreciate a
controversial argument,174 are also clearly not to be taken for granted.175
171. In somewhat formal terms, we may decreasingly recognize our political
antagonists as our genuine epistemic peers. See, e.g., Bryan Frances,
Disagreement 47–48 (2014) (defining epistemic peerhood); Nathan L. King,
Disagreement: What’s the Problem?, or A Good Peer Is Hard to Find, 85 Phil.
& Phenomenological Res. 249, 251-53 (2012); R George Wright, Epistemic
Peerhood in the Law, 91 St. John’s L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017).
172. See generally Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance (2d
ed. 2016) (pointing out that not all political ignorance, however otherwise
dismaying, need be narrowly irrational). See also Karoli Kuns, Justice David
Souter On Civic Ignorance: ‘That Is How Democracy Dies’, (Oct. 22, 2016,
5:00 AM), Crooks & Liars, http://crooksandliars.com/2016/10/justicedavid-souter-civic-ignorance-how [https://perma.cc/HWV4-4LQ3]; Reid Wilson,
Only 36 Percent of Americans Can Name the Three Branches of Government,
Wash. Post (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
govbeat/wp/2014/09/18/only-36-percent-of-americans-can-name-thethree-branches-of-government/?utm_term=.33313a3c9572 [https://perma.
cc/4RJH-T2EE].
173. See, e.g., Shalina Chatlani, Are Modern Standards Breeding a Decline in Cultural
Literacy?, Educ. Dive (June 30, 2016), http://www.educationdive.com/news/
are-modern-standards-breeding-a-decline-in-cultural-literacy/421401/ [https://
perma.cc/9MXY-CHS3]. See generally E.D. Hirsch, Why Knowledge
Matters: Rescuing Our Children From Failed Educational
Theories (2016). We set aside any possible effects of the rise to prominence of
what we might call short-form communications technologies.
174. See generally Richard Arum & Josipa Roksa, Academically Adrift:
Limited Learning on College Campuses 1 (2011); Douglas Belkin,
Exclusive Test Data: Many Colleges Fail to Improve Critical-Thinking Skills,
Wall St. J. (June 5, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/exclusive-testdata-many-colleges-fail-to-improve-critical-thinking-skills-1496686662
[https://perma.cc/RB9V-47YQ]. Even at the most elite levels, there are
conspicuous problems of systematic cognitive and ego-defensive biases and a
more general inability to exercise reasonable practical judgment. See, e.g.,
Chris Hayes, Twilight of the Elites: America After Meritocracy
(2012); Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (rev.
ed., 1993) (1936).
175. More speculatively, it may also be that many of us vaguely sense that however
intense or unshakeable of our basic political or legal beliefs, no ultimately rocksolid foundations are available to undergird or validate those beliefs. See the
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These considerations suggest that only a limited degree of confidence in the ability to reasonably persuade interlocutors from any
reasonably fair starting point is appropriate. Together, this translates
into an understandable lack of confidence in reasoned political and legal
argumentation, in the heckler’s veto context and elsewhere.
Under these circumstances, it is understandable that advocates
would be reluctant to make concessions even as to the status, meaning,
and scope of the heckler’s veto doctrine. Nor should we expect any
greater forensic confidence, or any greater willingness to make even
preliminary, reasonable concessions, until the grounds for the current
lack of such confidence have dissipated.

variety of more or less unambitious meta-ethical programs discussed in, for
example, Andrew Fisher, Metaethics: An Introduction (2014); Mark
van Roojen, Metaethics: A Contemporary Introduction (2015). For
a more specific discussion, see, for example, Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics
and Language (1944) (referring to ethics discussions as an ultimate matter
of emotivist appeals to approve or disapprove what the speaker approves or
disapproves). This may in some perhaps subconscious way further limit our
confidence in our ability to reasonably persuade others.
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